

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

E39

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 USBERL 02387 01 OF 04 081605Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 (AS-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00
INRE-00)/000 W

-----126542 082012Z /38

O 081537Z JUL 87

FM USMISSION USBERLIN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0750

AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY EMBBERLIN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USBERLIN 02387

EXDIS DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, UR, BZ, BQG

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR BURT'S JULY 7 LUNCHEON WITH SOVIET
 AMBASSADOR TO THE GDR KOCHEMASOV

1. SUMMARY: AS PART OF A SERIES OF REGULARLY SCHEDULED
BI-ANNUAL MEETINGS, AMBASSADOR BURT HOSTED A WORKING
LUNCHEON JULY 7 FOR SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO THE GDR
KOCHEMASOV. ALTHOUGH KOCHEMASOV WAS CONSTRAINED TO
RECITE AT LENGTH STANDARD SOVIET POSITIONS ON ARMS
CONTROL, GLASNOST, THE REAGAN SPEECH IN BERLIN, ETC.,
THE MEETING WAS SIGNIFICANT IN TWO RESPECTS: (1)
KOCHEMASOV INDICATED CLEARLY THAT THE SOVIETS ARE BOTH
CONCERNED AND BAFFLED BY WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS THE
"EXPLOSION OF INTEREST" IN THE FRG IN GERMAN-GERMAN
CONTACTS AND RE-UNIFICATION (LEFT UNSTATED, BUT
IMPLICIT, WAS SOVIET CONCERN OVER SIMILAR INTEREST IN
THE GDR); AND (2) WHILE UNWILLING TO CONTEMPLATE ANY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 USBERL 02387 01 OF 04 081605Z

RESPONSE TO THE BERLIN INITIATIVES CONTAINED IN THE
PRESIDENT'S "COLD WAR" JUNE 12 SPEECH, KOCHEMASOV
PROPOSED -- WITHOUT SPECIFICS -- A FOUR-POWER MEETING AT
THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL. AMBASSADOR BURT BELIEVES THAT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED

BOTH OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS SHOULD BE THE OBJECT OF
FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS TO BE PROPOSED SEPTEL. END SUMMARY.

KOCHEMASOV TOUCHES THE USUAL BASES

2. AMBASSADOR KOCHEMASOV WAS ACCOMPANIED AT THE JULY 7 LUNCHEON BY NEWLY-ARRIVED MINISTER MAKSIMYCHEV (REPLACEMENT FOR KOPTELTSSEV), COUNSELOR GRININ, AND A SOVIET INTERPRETER. KOCHEMASOV WAS RELAXED AND, DESPITE SOME FAIRLY TOUGH EXCHANGES, INCLUDING OCCASIONS WHEN AMBASSADOR BURT DEMONSTRATED THE FAULTY LOGIC OF THE SOVIET POSITION, REMAINED PERSONALLY PLEASANT THROUGHOUT. KOCHEMASOV FILLED A GOOD PART OF THE TWO AND ONE HALF HOUR CONVERSATION WITH A RECITATION OF STANDARD SOVIET VIEWS ON A VARIETY OF SUBJECTS, INCLUDING "GLASNOST" AND ARMS CONTROL.

3. IN RESPONSE TO AMBASSADOR BURT'S OPENING STATEMENT OF HOPEFUL DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN THE US AND USSR, KOCHEMASOV MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- ON GLASNOST AND PERESTROYKA: THESE ARE NECESSARY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION, AFFECTING ALL ASPECTS OF SOCIETY AND ECONOMY, AND ENCOMPASSING A VARIETY OF MEASURES, BUT "MOST IMPORTANTLY" DEMOCRATIZATION. ALTHOUGH MANDATED BY INTERNAL POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS, THE CHANGES WILL HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT ON SOVIET
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 USBERL 02387 01 OF 04 081605Z

FOREIGN POLICY, MAKING IT MORE "FLEXIBLE." SUCH CHANGES ARE NOT NECESSARILY APPROPRIATE FOR EASTERN EUROPE, HOWEVER.

-- ON ARMS CONTROL: AN INF AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE, BUT THE SOVIETS ARE "CONCERNED" THAT THE WESTERN MEDIA IS PAINTING "TOO ROSY A PICTURE OF THE POSSIBILITY FOR A QUICK SUCCESS". THE KEY DIFFICULTY IS THE AMERICAN VIEW THAT THE FRG'S PERSHING 1A'S MUST BE EXCLUDED FROM THE AGREEMENT. THIS IS AN "ARTIFICIAL" IMPEDIMENT. CONCLUSION OF AN INF AGREEMENT IS IMPORTANT AS A SPUR TO FURTHER AGREEMENTS AND WILL "OPEN THE WAY FOR A SUMMIT."

-- ON BERLIN: THE SOVIETS ARE SATISFIED WITH THE

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED

QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT. THEY SEEK A "CONSTRUCTIVE ATMOSPHERE" BUT THIS MUST BE BASED ON THE "REALITIES" OF THE SITUATION. THERE ARE TWO SOVEREIGN GERMAN STATES AND THERE IS WESTBERLIN AND BERLIN, THE CAPITAL OF THE GDR. KOCHEMASOV SAID HE HAD REASSURED GOVERNING MAYOR DIEPGEN THAT SOVIET CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH BERLIN WOULD CONTINUE, BUT THAT FURTHER DEVELOPMENT DEPENDED UPON THE SENAT'S ACTIONS.

KOCHERASSOV ON THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS

4. IN RESPONSE TO AMBASSADOR BURT'S POINTED QUESTION, KOCHERASSOV TURNED TO THE SOVIET REACTION TO PRESIDENT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 USBERL 02387 02 OF 04 081607Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /000 W
-----114435 081608Z /38

O 081537Z JUL 87
FM USMISSION USBERLIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0751
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY EMBERLIN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED

USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 USBERLIN 02387

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, UR, BZ, BQG

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR BURT'S JULY 7 LUNCHEON WITH SOVIET

REAGAN'S JUNE 12 SPEECH. KOCHEMASOV EXPRESSED "REGRET AND SADNESS" AT THE SPEECH'S TONE AND CONTENT. THE SPEECH, HE SAID, WAS "NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF NORMAL RELATIONS AND THE INTERESTS OF OUR (SOVIET) ALLIES" BUT RATHER A RETURN TO THE "COLD WAR" RHETORIC WHICH CHARACTERIZED THE "EARLY YEARS OF THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY." KOCHEMASOV SAID THAT THE SOVIETS HAD STUDIED THE SPEECH CAREFULLY, BUT FOUND NO BASIS ON WHICH TO PROCEED.

5. WITH REGARD TO THE FOUR SPECIFIC PROPOSALS MADE BY THE PRESIDENT, KOCHEMASOV SAID THE FOLLOWING:

-- ON AN OLYMPICS IN BERLIN: KOCHEMASOV SAID THIS WAS UNREALISTIC AND NOTED THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 USBERL 02387 02 OF 04 081607Z

SEOUL OLYMPICS WERE LARGELY COMPLETE. WHEN AMBASSADOR BURT SAID THAT THE PROPOSAL WAS FOR A FUTURE OLYMPICS AND NOT ONE ALREADY SCHEDULED, KOCHEMASOV SOMEWHAT LAMELY NOTED THAT THE IOC (INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE) IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SCHEDULING OLYMPICS.

-- ON YOUTH EXCHANGES AND OTHER CONTACTS: KOCHEMASOV SAID THAT CURRENT FRG/GDR EXCHANGES WERE VERY BROAD AND HE DID NOT SEE HOW THEY COULD BE EXPANDED. WHEN AMBASSADOR BURT RESPONDED THAT THE GDR HAD JUST RAISED CONCERN THAT IT WISHED TO CUT BACK ON CONTACTS BY REDUCING THE AMOUNT OF EAST GERMAN MARKS CITIZENS OF THE GDR COULD EXCHANGE FOR WEST GERMAN MARKS, KOCHEMASOV SAID THAT SUCH QUESTIONS WERE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FRG AND GDR.

-- ON INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS IN BERLIN: KOCHEMASOV SAID THAT THERE ALREADY WERE LOTS OF INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS HELD IN WEST BERLIN AND LOTS HELD IN BERLIN,

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED

THE CAPITAL OF THE GDR. IT WAS UP TO THE ORGANIZATIONS AND THE RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS IF THEY WISHED TO EXPAND THIS. WHEN AMBASSADOR BURT SUGGESTED THAT A CSCE OR OTHER MEETING ENTAILING EUROPEAN PROCESS S BE HELD JOINTLY IN THE TWO SECTORS OF THE CITY, KOCHEMASOV WAS CLEARLY STARTLED. HE RETREATED TO THE FORMULATION THAT THERE WAS NO SOVIET SECTOR AND THAT HE DID NOT THINK ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MADE.

-- ON BERLIN AS AN AVIATION CENTER: KOCHEMASOV SAID THAT AVIATION ISSUES ARE "VERY COMPLEX." HE SAID THAT SOVIET AND GDR DEFENSE INTERESTS WERE INVOLVED. HE SAID THAT THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN TROOPS AND CONTROL OF PERSHING 1A WARHEADS ON FRG SOIL ADDED TO SOVIET AND

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 USBERL 02387 02 OF 04 081607Z

GDR SECURITY CONCERNS. ANY CHANGE IN THE BERLIN AIR REGIME WOULD THEREFORE BE DEPENDENT ON WHEN AND HOW AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT WOULD RESOLVE THESE DEFENSE AND SECURITY CONCERNS.

AMBASSADOR BURT'S RESPONSE

6. AMBASSADOR BURT RESPONDED TO EACH OF KOCHEMASOV'S MAIN POINTS AS FOLLOWS:

-- ON ARMS CONTROL: AMBASSADOR BURT SAID THAT HE FOLLOWS THIS ISSUE WITH SPECIAL INTEREST. THE QUESTION OF THE PERSHING 1A'S HAD NOT BEEN RAISED BEFORE BY THE SOVIET SIDE IN THE MANY YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS. BY RAISING IT NOW, THE SOVIETS WERE CREATING THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY WERE INTERESTED MORE IN A PUBLIC RELATIONS STANCE THAN IN REACHING AN ARMS CONTROL ACCORD.

-- ON THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH: AMBASSADOR BURT EXPRESSED SURPRISE AND KEEN DISAPPOINTMENT IN THE SOVIET REACTION. HE SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT IS A MAN WITH STRONG BELIEFS, NONE OF WHICH ARE STRONGER THAN HIS BELIEF THAT THE TRAGIC DIVISION OF BERLIN SHOULD BE ENDED. THE SPEECH WAS NOT PROPAGANDA BUT SPOKEN FROM THE HEART. AMBASSADOR BURT SAID THAT THE HE THOUGHT THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH REFLECTED NOT ONLY THE VIEWS OF MOST AMERICANS, BUT MOST EUROPEANS AS WELL.

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 USBERL 02387 03 OF 04 081609Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /001 W
-----114522 081621Z /41 38

O 081537Z JUL 87
FM USMISSION USBERLIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0752
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY EMBBERLIN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 USBERLIN 02387

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, UR, BZ, BQG
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR BURT'S JULY 7 LUNCHEON WITH SOVIET

-- ON GLASNOST: THE REAL TEST OF A NEW SOVIET POLICY
IS HERE IN BERLIN. IT WAS FOR THAT REASON THAT THE
PRESIDENT MADE THESE FOUR IMPORTANT PROPOSALS. THESE
ARE SUGGESTIONS MADE IN THE SPIRIT OF OPENNESS, AND THE

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED

USG IS READY TO CONTINUE WITH FURTHER DISCUSSION ON ANY AND ALL OF THEM. AMBASSADOR KOCHEMASOV'S REACTION TO THESE PROPOSALS DID NOT REFLECT "GLASNOST." NEITHER DID THE GDR'S ACTION TO MAKE TRAVEL TO THE WEST MORE DIFFICULT FOR GDR CITIZENS. WERE THE SOVIETS PREPARED TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION ON THESE PROPOSALS?

7. AFTER AGAIN EXPRESSING HIS VIEW THAT LITTLE MORE COULD BE DONE IN THE AREAS SUGGESTED BY THE PRESIDENT, AND INSISTING THAT THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH COULD NOT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 USBERL 02387 03 OF 04 081609Z

SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR DISCUSSION, KOCHEMASOV ALLOWED THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE PREPARED FOR FURTHER TALKS. KOCHEMASOV SAID THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD ONLY CONSIDER SPECIFIC, CONCRETE PROPOSALS BASED ON THE EXISTING SITUATION AS IT HAD DEVELOPED IN BERLIN.

KOCHMASOV'S PROPOSAL

8. WHILE UNWILLING TO GO FURTHER IN CONSIDERING THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVES, KOCHEMASOV STRESSED THE SOVIET DESIRE FOR "CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS." HE ADVANCED AN IDEA THAT HE SAID HAD "JUST OCCURRED TO HIM" THAT THE FOUR AMBASSADORS (U.S., SOVIET, BRITISH, FRENCH) SHOULD MEET IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO DISCUSS "PROBLEMS THAT ARE BOTHERING US." HE CONTINUED THAT THIS "IDEA" WAS NOT COMPLETELY FORMED, BUT IT WOULD BE USEFUL, FOR EXAMPLE, FOR THE FOUR POWERS TO DISCUSS THE "SECURITY PROBLEMS" WHICH RESULTED IN THE RECENT "MASSIVE POLICE MEASURES" TAKEN "AGAINST THE PEOPLE OF BERLIN". (NOTE: KOCHEMASOV WAS NOT MORE SPECIFIC BUT COULD HAVE BEEN REFERRING TO SECURITY MEASURES ATTENDING THE VISITS OF ALLIED HEADS OF STATE AND/OR TO THE RIOT IN EARLY JUNE IN KREUZBERG.) KOCHEMASOV CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THIS AND OTHER PROBLEMS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AMONG THE FOUR POWERS AND ALSO WITH THE WEST BERLIN SENAT.

9. COMMENT: WE THINK THAT KOCHEMASOV'S SUGGESTION SHOULD BE PURSUED, BUT NOT, OF COURSE, AS HE DEFINED IT. FOUR POWER DISCUSSIONS AT THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL, WHICH HAVE AS THEIR OBJECTIVE THE SEARCH FOR AREAS
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 USBERL 02387 03 OF 04 081609Z

WHERE PROGRESS ON BERLIN ISSUES MIGHT BE FOUND, WOULD ALLOW US TO PURSUE THOSE INITIATIVES PROPOSED BY THE PRESIDENT. WHAT WE WANT TO AVOID, HOWEVER, IS THE APPEARANCE THAT THE FOUR POWERS HAVE COME TOGETHER TO RESOLVE "PROBLEMS" ONLY FOR WEST BERLIN. WE ALSO WANT TO AVOID ANY APPEARANCE THAT WE HAVE ACTIVATED THE CONSULTATION CLAUSE IN THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT OF 1971 WHICH MIGHT GIVE THE FALSE IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE OPENING UP THE QA TO FURTHER NEGOTIATION. END COMMENT.

-

KOCHEMASSOV REVEALS SOVIET CONCERN OVER GERMANY

10. THE ONE CLEAR ITEM KOCHEMASSOV HAD ON HIS AGENDA WAS TO EXPLORE U.S. ATTITUDES ON THE INCREASED INTEREST IN THE FRG IN GERMAN-GERMAN CONTACTS AND REUNIFICATION. KOCHEMASSOV ASKED AMBASSADOR BURT: "HOW DO YOU EXPLAIN THE EXPLOSION OF INTEREST IN THE FRG IN THE QUESTION OF RE-UNIFICATION?" KOCHEMASSOV NOTED THAT DURING THE RECENT SUMMIT MEETING OF THE WARSAW PACT IN EAST BERLIN, WESTERN JOURNALISTS HAD STATED THAT GORBACHEV WOULD BE PREPARED TO PROPOSE THE RE-UNIFICATION OF GERMANY. CLEARLY, KOCHEMASSOV SAID, THIS WAS AN EFFORT TO AROUSE GREATER FRG INTEREST IN THE ISSUE, BUT HE INDICATED HE BELIEVED THAT THIS PHENOMENON WAS NOT JUST THE RESULT OF MEDIA HYPE.

11. AMBASSADOR BURT ANSWERED THAT THE WEST GERMAN DESIRE FOR GREATER INNER-GERMAN CONTACTS WAS NOT AN

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 USBERL 02387 04 OF 04 081611Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /000 W
-----114564 081612Z /38

O 081537Z JUL 87
FM USMISSION USBERLIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0753
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY EMBBERLIN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 USBERLIN 02387

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, UR,BZ, BQG
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR BURT'S JULY 7 LUNCHEON WITH SOVIET

ORGANIZED CAMPAIGN BUT RATHER THE UNDERSTANDABLE RESULT
OF A HISTORICAL PROCESS. THERE ARE GERMANS OLD ENOUGH
TO REMEMBER A UNITED GERMANY AND THOSE YOUNG ENOUGH TO
BE CURIOUS ABOUT WHAT IS HAPPENING ON THE OTHER SIDE OF
THE WALL. THE SOVIETS NEEDED TO BE SENSITIVE TO THE
FACT THAT THE DIVISION OF GERMANY HAD TORN FAMILIES
APART. FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS
BORN IN EAST BERLIN AND HONECKER IN THE SAARLAND. IT
HAS ONLY BEEN FORTY YEARS SINCE THE END OF WORLD WAR
II, AND GERMANS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE WALL WANT MORE
CONTACTS. COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY IS CHANGING THE
WORLD, AND IT IS INEVITABLE THAT BOTH GERMANIES SHOULD
DESIRE MORE DIRECT CONTACT. THE U.S. FIRMLY SUPPORTS A
UNITED EUROPE. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THIS WILL NOT HAPPEN
TOMORROW. IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE, HOWEVER, FOR EITHER
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 USBERL 02387 04 OF 04 081611Z

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED

THE US OR THE USSR TO RESIST THE HUMAN DESIRE FOR INCREASED GERMAN-GERMAN CONTACTS.

12. KOCHEMASOV THEN ASKED IF THE NATO ALLIES SHARED THE U.S. VIEW ON THE QUESTION OF GERMAN RE-UNIFICATION? ANSWERING HIS OWN QUESTION, KOCHEMASOV SAID THAT HIS CONTACTS WITH WESTERN DIPLOMATS IN EAST BERLIN CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED THAT THE WEST EUROPEANS WERE NOT INTERESTED IN THE POSSIBILITY OF GERMAN RE-UNIFICATION. WHILE AMBASSADOR BURT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT MANY WESTERN EUROPEANS DO NOT SHARE THE AMERICAN VIEW, HE POINTED OUT THAT GLASNOST HAD RAISED EXPECTATIONS AND THAT, TO PARAPHRASE DE TOQUEVILLE, REVOLUTIONS START WHEN EXPECTATIONS ARE HIGH, NOT LOW. AMBASSADOR BURT NOTED THAT EFFORTS TO SUPPRESS OR THWART GERMAN-GERMAN RELATIONS WILL ONLY LEAD TO INCREASED GERMAN INTEREST IN BOTH THE FRG AND GDR IN SUCH CONTACTS, KOCHEMASOV REPLIED THOUGHTFULLY, "GOOD POINT."

13. COMMENT: KOCHEMASOV SEEMED GENUINELY CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS AN "EXPLOSION" OF INTEREST IN GERMAN-GERMAN RELATIONS. HE REMARKED THAT THIS PHENOMENON WAS NOT ONLY OCCURRING IN THE FRG (MEANING IT WAS ALSO EVIDENT IN THE GDR). KOCHEMASOV DID NOT ATTEMPT TO PRONOUNCE A SOVIET VIEW ON THIS DEVELOPMENT, BUT RATHER SEEMED MORE INTERESTED IN ASCERTAINING THE USG VIEW FOR USE IN SOVIET ANALYSIS.

14. KOCHEMASOV'S LINE OF QUESTIONING ECHOES EXPRESSIONS WE HAVE HEARD FROM OTHERS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO BEEN AWARE OF THE DEVELOPING INTEREST IN GERMAN-GERMAN RELATIONS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE WALL, ON

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 USBERL 02387 04 OF 04 081611Z

WHICH WE HAVE REPORTED EXTENSIVELY. KOCHEMASOV'S REMARKS ALSO SUGGEST THAT THE SOVIETS MAY HAVE BEGUN TO RETHINK THEIR PREVIOUSLY OBT-ESPOUSED POSITION OF "MAINTAINING CONTROL" OVER THE GERMANS AND HE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE "PRIMITIVE" FOR THE USSR TO DICTATE TO THE GDR ON GERMAN-GERMAN QUESTIONS. WHILE KOCHEMASOV SMILED IN AGREEMENT WHEN AMBASSADOR BURT EXPRESSED THE NEED TO MAINTAIN STABILITY IN EUROPE, HE ALSO TOOK AMBASSADOR BURT'S POINT THAT CHANGE WAS INEVITABLE AND THAT THE USSR WOULD BE COMMITTING A "MISTAKE OF

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

C17248426

HISTORIC PROPORTIONS" TO RESIST THIS. END COMMENT.

CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED

15. AMBASSADOR BURT HAS APPROVED THIS CABLE.

16. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. KORNBLUM

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL